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320 LLOYD’S MARITIME  AND  COMMERCIAL  LAW  QUARTERLY
 DEFAULT STANDARDS FOR NON-ABSOLUTE 
OBLIGATION CLAUSES? 
 KS Energy v BR Energy 
 Electricity Generation v Woodside Energy 
 A “reasonable endeavours” undertaking, and its variants, are common features of 
commercial contracts. These clauses might be inserted into agreements to balance the 
interests of the parties where the achievement of the contractual object involves conditions 
beyond the obligor’s control, for example, the procurement of a third party’s performance. 
Equally common is the insertion of these clauses into contracts to resolve a negotiation 
stalemate where one party refuses to promise the absolute achievement of the contractual 
objective. 
 Notwithstanding their common usage, the general principles regarding the interpretation 
and scope of non-absolute obligation clauses remain mired in some uncertainty. In 
decisions delivered just a week apart, both the Singapore Court of Appeal and the High 
Court of Australia established general guidelines on the approach to be taken in respect 
of such clauses. Each case presented different aspects of the uncertainties surrounding 
non-absolute obligation clauses. In  KS Energy Services Ltd v BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd , 1 
the Singapore Court of Appeal pronounced on the general approach to a simple “all 
reasonable endeavours” clause, as well as its relationship with “best endeavours” and 
“reasonable endeavours” clauses. In  Electricity Generation Corporation T/AS Verve 
Energy v Woodside Energy Ltd , 2 the High Court of Australia considered a “reasonable 
endeavours” clause that was qualifi ed by an explicit provision on how the obligor’s 
interests are to be balanced against the obligee’s interests. Both cases go some way towards 
resolving the confusion surrounding non-absolute obligation clauses. 
 KS Energy : Singapore Court of Appeal 
 In  KS Energy , BR Energy had been awarded a contract to charter an oil rig to Petronas. The 
oil rig was to be delivered to Petronas by 21 March 2006. As it turned out, however, BR 
Energy’s original partners for the project had to pull out. BR Energy therefore approached 
KS Energy, which was in the business of chartering capital equipment in the oil and 
gas industry, to deliver the oil rig. KS Energy found a third-party contractor, Oderco, to 
construct the oil rig. It also formed a joint venture company with BR Energy to procure the 
oil rig and then charter it out, in fulfi lment of BR Energy’s original contract with Petronas. 
The joint venture agreement stipulated that KS Energy was to: 
 “use all reasonable endeavours to procure the [oil rig] is constructed and ready for delivery in Abu 
Dhabi or other location specifi ed by [KS Energy] within six months after the Charter Agreement is 
executed”. 
 1 .   [2014] SGCA 16. 
 2 .   [2014] HCA 7. 
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 CASE  AND  COMMENT 321
 However, Oderco was unable to meet the timelines. The construction of the oil rig was 
not completed even well past the original deadline for delivery. After multiple fruitless 
chasers and extensions of time to BR Energy, Petronas terminated the contract with BR 
Energy. Although the oil rig was useless to BR Energy by this time, KS Energy took over 
its construction from Oderco. In the end, BR Energy’s relationship with KS Energy soured, 
which led BR Energy to write to KS Energy to terminate the joint venture agreement for 
breach of a fundamental term. BR Energy’s primary contention was that KS Energy had 
failed to “use all reasonable endeavours to procure the [oil rig] is constructed and ready 
for delivery on time”. 
 The trial judge found on these facts that KS Energy had failed to use all reasonable 
endeavours to procure the construction and delivery of the oil rig within a certain time 
frame. 3 This holding was reversed on appeal. The Singapore Court of Appeal held that, 
as a starting point, KS Energy was required to be a prudent and determined company 
acting in the interests of BR Energy, and anxious to procure the contractual outcome 
within the stipulated timeframe. 4 In so far as the timelines were concerned, the Court of 
Appeal thought that those stipulated in the joint venture agreement constituted the upper 
limit of KS Energy’s obligations; it had to use all reasonable endeavours to ensure that 
this timeline was not breached, but it did not have to bring about an earlier delivery of 
the oil rig. 
 Importantly, the Court of Appeal distinguished between an obligation to use all 
reasonable endeavours to procure a third party’s performance and an obligation to use 
all reasonable endeavours to perform the same oneself. 5  KS Energy concerned the former 
situation. 6 In any event, KS Energy’s employees had been persistent in pushing Oderco 
to perform: they deployed staff at Oderco’s yard, assisted in the procurement of critical 
equipment, and even paid out money to help with Oderco’s cash fl ow problems. In this 
regard, the Court of Appeal rejected BR Energy’s argument that KS Energy should have 
deployed permanent on-site personnel to supervise Oderco’s construction of the oil rig: 
the court did not regard it reasonable to expect that KS Energy could have secured such 
an intrusive right  vis-à-vis a third-party builder. The Court of Appeal further rejected 
BR Energy’s argument that KS Energy should have been more forceful in its dealings 
with Oderco, as the reasonableness and correctness of KS Energy’s endeavours were 
not to be judged with the benefi t of hindsight. On the whole, the Court of Appeal was 
satisfi ed that KS Energy had exercised all reasonable endeavours, being a prudent and 
determined company acting in the interests of BR Energy to have a third party construct 
the oil rig. 
 More generally, in the interest of promoting commercial certainty, the Court of Appeal 
enunciated a set of guidelines on the  prima facie interpretations and scope of non-absolute 
obligation clauses. 7 First, there is little or no relevant difference between the standard 
imposed by an “all reasonable endeavours” clause and a “best endeavours” clause. 
 3 .   [2013] 2 SLR 1154. 
 4 .   [2014] SGCA 16, [136]. 
 5 .   Ibid , [137]. 
 6 .   Ibid , [150]. 
 7 .   Ibid , [62] and [93]. 
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322 LLOYD’S MARITIME  AND  COMMERCIAL  LAW  QUARTERLY
According to the Court of Appeal,  prima facie , both require the obligor to exhaust all 
reasonable endeavours, but reasonable endeavours are confi ned to those which have a 
signifi cant or real prospect of success. However, the obligor would not be faulted for 
choosing a reasonable course of action that turned out to be ineffective. 8 In that respect, 
there is not much difference between the two types of clause. By contrast, a simple 
“reasonable endeavours” undertaking merely requires the obligor to act reasonably to 
procure the contractual outcome. 9 Second, the obligor is not always required to sacrifi ce 
its own commercial interests in satisfaction of its undertaking, but this would not be the 
case if the parties had contemplated that the obligor should do so. Third, the obligor would 
not have exhausted all reasonable endeavours if the obligor might have discovered other 
reasonable steps that could have been taken had it consulted the obligee. Finally, as a 
matter of proof, once the obligee points to certain steps which the obligor could have taken 
to achieve the contractual outcome, the burden ordinarily shifts to the obligor to show 
that these steps were either not reasonably required or that they would have no prospect 
of success. 
 Woodside : Australian High Court 
 Woodside concerned a long-term gas supply agreement between Verve and various gas 
suppliers in Western Australia, including Woodside. Verve is a major supplier of electricity 
to a large area in Western Australia. There were separate contracts with each gas supplier 
under the gas supply agreement. Under the contract between Verve and Woodside, 
which was identical to the contracts with all other suppliers, Woodside was to supply 
Verve a maximum daily quantity of gas. Woodside was also obliged to use “reasonable 
endeavours” to supply a supplemental daily quantity of gas to Verve if Verve’s daily 
nomination exceeded the maximum daily quantity. Crucially, the “reasonable endeavours” 
clause further stipulated that: 
 “In determining whether [the suppliers] are able to supply [the supplemental quantity of gas] on 
a Day, [the suppliers] may take into account all relevant commercial, economic and operational 
matters . . .”. 
 As it turned out, a gas plant explosion temporarily affected the gas supply. As a result 
of Woodside’s refusal to supply the supplemental quantity of gas under the original 
contract, Verve entered into a new contract under protest with them for the supply of 
gas at the prevailing market rate. The dispute centred on whether Woodside breached 
the “reasonable endeavours” clause, which in turn had a bearing on Verve’s claims for 
rescission of the new contract on the basis of economic duress as well as for restitution. 
Neither party disputed that Woodside had the capacity to supply the supplemental quantity 
of gas during this period. The Supreme Court of Western Australia found that Woodside 
was not in breach of the clause. 10 The Court of Appeal of Western Australia, however, 
reversed this holding. 11 
    8 .  Ibid , [131]. 
    9 .   Ibid , [63]. 
 10 .   [2011] WASC 268. 
 11 .   [2013] WASCA 36. 
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 On appeal before the High Court of Australia, the majority (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan 
and Kiefel JJ) overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling, 12 and held that the clause, construed 
within the wider contract and in a businesslike manner, did not oblige Woodside to supply 
the supplemental quantity of gas to Verve in confl ict with their own commercial interests. 
The word “able” was not to be interpreted as Woodside’s objective capacity to supply gas. 
What constitutes a “reasonable” endeavour is in part qualifi ed by constraints imposed 
by commercial and economic considerations as stipulated in the clause. Thus, Woodside 
could decide not to supply the supplemental quantity owing to price considerations, 
even though it objectively maintained the ability to do so. More generally, the majority 
also made three observations regarding a “reasonable endeavours” clause. 13 First, it is a 
non-absolute obligation. Second, the nature and extent of the obligation are qualifi ed by 
reasonableness. The undertaking does not require the obligor to achieve the contractual 
object to the disregard of its own business interests. Finally, some non-absolute obligation 
clauses may set out their own standard of reasonableness, for example, by reference to 
conditions relevant to the obligor’s business interests. 
 Dissenting, Gageler J construed the undertaking to mean that Woodside could take into 
account all relevant commercial, economic and operational matters in determining their 
 objective  capacity to supply supplemental quantity of gas to Verve. 14 Thus, such matters 
did not extend to conferring the discretion to Woodside not to supply the supplemental 
quantity based on commercial considerations (such as the ability to obtain a higher price) 
if Woodside was still  objectively “able” to supply gas. Gageler J said that the converse 
interpretation, as put forward by the suppliers, would be a result that would render the 
undertaking “elusive”, if not “illusory”. 15 
 Differentiating the different obligations 
 Notwithstanding that non-absolute binding obligations 16 are commonplace clauses in 
commercial contracts, the English authorities are unclear as to the precise nature of these 
obligations, and how they are to be distinguished. It was thought at one time that there 
is no real difference between “best endeavours” and “reasonable endeavours” clauses. 17 
Some later English cases, however, suggested a difference not only between these 
clauses, but also “all reasonable endeavours” clauses. Thus, in  Jolley v Carmel Ltd , 18 
Kim Lewison QC stated that the phrases “reasonable efforts”, “all reasonable efforts” 
and “best endeavours” denoted a spectrum of obligations, with “reasonable efforts” 
being at “the lowest end of the spectrum”. 19 A few other cases have since raised some 
doubts regarding these distinctions. For example, in  Rhodia International Holdings 
Ltd v Huntsman International LLC , 20 Flaux QC held that a “best endeavours” clause and 
 12 .   [2014] HCA 7, [44–48]. 
 13 .   Ibid , [41]. 
 14 .   Ibid , [62]. 
 15 .   Ibid , [59–60]. 
 16 .   Cf an agreement to use one’s best endeavours to agree is not suffi ciently certain to amount to a binding 
obligation: see  Little v Courage Ltd (1994) 70 P & CR 469 (CA), 476 (Millett LJ). 
 17 .   Overseas Buyers v Granadex [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 608, 613 (Mustill J). 
 18 .   [2000] 2 EGLR 153. 
 19 .   Ibid , 159. 
 20 .   [2007] 1 CLC 59. 
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an “all reasonable endeavours” clause meant the same thing, whereas a mere “reasonable 
endeavours” clause meant a lower standard of obligation, since it obliges a party to take 
only  one reasonable course of action, and not  all of them. 21 While it is not doubted that 
the content of the obligation is an issue of construction in each case, the lack of consensus 
in the English authorities is also partly attributable to the fact that the content of the 
obligation was not determinative of the dispute in some cases; and, even in cases where 
the issue was germane to the litigation, the judge did not have all previous cases before 
him for consideration. 22 
 The Australian position remains unclear as well. In the earlier case of  Transfi eld 
Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd , 23 the High Court held that a “best endeavours” clause 
required the obligor to “do what [it] could reasonably do in the circumstances”. Recent 
Australian cases, however, may have read down the distinctions between the different 
clauses somewhat. For example,  Centennial Coal Co Ltd v Xstrata Coal Pty Ltd  24 (a case 
concerning “all reasonable endeavours”) is notable for the equation of the “all reasonable 
endeavours” obligation with the “best endeavours” obligation. More recently, in  Cypjayne 
Pty Ltd v Babcock & Brown International Pty Ltd ,  25 the Court of Appeal of New South 
Wales commented that Australian courts have considered both “best endeavours” and 
“reasonable endeavours” undertakings as imposing  similar obligations. However, in 
 Foster v Hall , 26 the Court of Appeal of New South Wales clarifi ed that a “best reasonable 
endeavours” obligation, by virtue of the word “best”, imposes a “somewhat higher” 
obligation than a simple “reasonable endeavours” obligation. It equated a “best reasonable 
endeavours” undertaking with a “best endeavours” undertaking, at least for purposes of 
the dispute before it. 27 In  Woodside , the majority (citing  Cypjayne ) noted that the argument 
before the court proceeded on the basis that the types of clause impose “substantially 
similar obligations”, 28 without explicitly affi rming the correctness of this basis. Nor did the 
majority explain what “similar obligations” entailed or, importantly, what the distinctions 
between them are. 
 It is therefore laudable that the Singapore Court of Appeal has laid down clear, 
pragmatic guidelines in  KS Energy regarding the  prima facie interpretations of the 
various expressions. Notably, in rejecting Lewison QC’s view in  Jolley , 29 the court rightly 
pointed out that it would be a “pointless hair-splitting exercise” to distinguish between 
“best endeavours” and “all reasonable endeavours” clauses. The eradication of this fi ne 
distinction will indirectly encourage parties to spell out more precisely the exact obligations 
 21 .   Ibid , [33]. Also see EDI Central Ltd v National Car Parks Ltd [2011] SLT 75, [20] (Lord Glennie). 
 22 .   B Holland, “Doing your best: making the most of the muddle of the ‘reasonable endeavours’ undertaking” 
(2007) 18 ICCLR 349, 353. 
 23 .   (1980) 44 CLR 83, 101. See also  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 
CLR 41, 64–65, 91–92 and 118. 
 24 .   [2009] NSWSC 788; affd [2009] NSWCA 341. 
 25 .   (2011) 282 ALR 152, [67]. The case itself concerned a “reasonable commercial endeavours” obligation. 
 26 .   [2012] NSWCA 122, [33]. 
 27 .   Ibid , [33]. 
 28 .   [2014] HCA 7, [40]. 
 29 .   Cf Lewison LJ’s extrajudicial view that the obligation to use “all reasonable endeavours” equates with the 
obligation to use best endeavours: Sir K Lewison,  The Interpretation of Contracts , 5th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2011), [16.07]. 
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expected of the obligor. Both expressions entail the same obligation: to take all those 
reasonable steps which a prudent and determined man, acting in his own interests, would 
have taken. 30 Under Singapore law, a distinction is instead drawn between an obligation to 
use  all reasonable endeavours and an obligation to use reasonable endeavours; the latter 
only requiring the obligor to act reasonably to procure the contractual outcome. This is a 
distinction that is meaningful and suffi ciently certain in practice. The situation would of 
course be different if the parties expressly stipulated the steps to be taken by the obligor 
to discharge its “best endeavours” or “all reasonable endeavours” obligation; the enquiry 
is then directed at whether those steps had been taken. 31 
 For Singaporean lawyers, and perhaps a more general audience, a point of contract drafting 
is this: it is meaningless to fi ght over nuanced differences in expressions, even if, intuitively, the 
phrase “best endeavours” appears to import a higher degree of obligation than “all reasonable 
endeavours”, which in turn suggests that the obligor might be required to act against its 
commercial interests for the former obligation. Rather than risk the uncertainty inherent in a 
thin distinction between “best endeavours” and “all reasonable endeavours”, parties should 
specify the obligations required, even if non-exhaustively so as to cater for completely 
unforeseen circumstances. For example, parties should set out in the contract expenditure 
limits, time frame and other matters that might materially affect the obligor’s solvency. Short 
of express stipulation, it seems unreasonable (and unrealistic) to treat commercial men as 
having agreed to act contrary to their own commercial interests to the extent of jeopardising 
their own business. After all, avoidance of insolvency might well be the reason the obligor had 
not agreed to achieving the contractual outcome absolutely. 
 As such,  KS Energy offers some pragmatic points of refl ection for English and Australian 
courts on the interpretation of non-absolute obligation undertakings. The convergence of 
interpretation across the various jurisdictions on a pragmatic basis would greatly promote 
certainty for transnational trade. In truth, whether in a commercial context or not, it is 
diffi cult to determine what is the “best” thing to do in the circumstances. The oft-cited 
fi duciary duty to act in the best interests of a principal aptly illustrates the point. 32 Its 
existence, content and enforceability have been repeatedly questioned. 33 From whose 
perspective are the principal’s best interests adjudged; what is the standard required? 
Fiduciary duties, no matter that they are onerous, must be kept within realistic and certain 
bounds. 34  A fortiori , contractual duties should be similarly confi ned. 
 30 .   The same will thus also apply for variants of these expressions, such as “reasonable best efforts” and 
“commercially reasonable best efforts”. 
 31 .   [2014] SGCA 16, [62]. This is in line with the English position:  Rhodia International Holdings Ltd v 
Huntsman International LLC [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 577. 
 32 .   Cf M Conalgen,  Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-fi duciary Duties (Hart, 2011), 
54–58. Conalgen argues that the “best interests” duty is not a fi duciary duty, that is, it is not a duty peculiar to 
fi duciaries. In his view, it had been used variously by the courts to mean different things, including a restatement 
of the fi duciary’s duty of care. 
 33 .   GW Thomas, “The duty of trustees to act in the ‘best interests’ of their benefi ciaries” (2008) 2 J Eq 177, 
177–178. Thomas argues that the “best interests” duty serves as a shorthand for some of the core functions of 
trustees. It is, in other words, a foundational concept underpinning these core functions. 
 34 .   It is noteworthy that the English Court of Appeal had upheld a duty of disclosure based on the “fi duciary 
duty” to act in the best interests of the principal in  Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi [2004] EWCA Civ 1244; 
[2005] 2 BCLC 91, seemingly suggesting that the duty exists and is enforceable. However, the case had been 
subject to trenchant criticisms. Later English cases have also generally confi ned the ratio of  Item Software to the 
context of a director’s duties: see, eg,  GHLM Trading Ltd v Maroo [2012] EWHC 61 (Ch), [192–195]. 
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 Sacrifi ce of the obligor’s commercial interests? 
 Another uncertain aspect of the non-absolute obligation concerns whether the obligation 
requires the obligor to act against its commercial interests and, if so, to what extent? Prior to 
 KS Energy and  Woodside , some older English cases appeared to suggest that the obligor is in 
a quasi-fi duciary relationship in relation to the obligee, such that the obligor must thus align 
its interests entirely with the obligee’s interests. 35 Yet, in other cases, there was no explicit 
attempt by the English courts to discuss the relevance of the obligor’s own interests. 36 
 In  KS Energy , the Singapore Court of Appeal suggested that a distinction ought to be 
made between an obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to procure a  third party’s 
performance and an obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to perform the same 
oneself. As  KS Energy concerned the former situation, it was not necessary for the court 
to articulate what would be required in the latter scenario. It is likely that, given that 
the achievement of a contractual outcome in the former scenario is beyond the obligor’s 
control, the Singapore courts would construe “all reasonable endeavours” in light of this 
factor, and thus a slightly higher obligation might be  prima facie required in a scenario 
where one is to use “all reasonable endeavours” to achieve the outcome on  one’s own . 
This higher obligation might require the obligor to sacrifi ce its own commercial interests 
in fulfi lling its promise. The distinction appears sensible as a  prima facie guideline. 
However, each case must still be determined on its own facts, as we shall see when we 
apply the distinction to a case such as  Woodside below. Moreover, the two scenarios may 
not always be so different as to justify a difference in treatment. For instance, even in a 
case of procurement of a third party’s performance, the obligor may face diffi culties in 
achieving that because the third party has made demands (extorting a higher price, etc) 
which may jeopardise the obligor’s solvency. This is quite different from a situation of the 
obligor’s having to obtain a licence from a regulatory authority, a matter that is quite out 
of the obligor’s hands once it has duly completed the steps of application. 
 This distinction could also be inferred from two English cases:  Yewbelle v London Green 
Developments  37 and  Jet2.com Ltd v Blackpool Airport Ltd . 38 In  Yewbelle , the English High 
Court held that the obligor is not required to sacrifi ce its own commercial interests in 
meeting a non-absolute obligation to procure a third party’s performance. A contrasting case 
can be seen in  Jet2.com , where an airport and an airline entered into an agreement pursuant 
to which it was agreed,  inter alia , that both would use their “best endeavours” to promote 
the airline’s low cost services. The airport was found by the English Court of Appeal to 
be in breach of this obligation in refusing to accept arrivals or allow departures from that 
airline outside of the airport’s normal operation hours, even though the airport might suffer 
some loss. 39 It could thus be surmised that where a third party is involved in the obligor’s 
 35 .   Sheffi eld District Railway Co v Great Central Railway Co (1911) 27 TLR 451, 452;  IBM United Kingdom 
Ltd v Rockware Glass Ltd [1980] FSR 335 (CA). 
 36 .   See, eg,  Stephen v Scottish Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association (The Talisman) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 535. 
 37 .   [2007] EWCA Civ 475. 
 38 .   [2011] 2 All ER (Comm) 988, [46]. Also, see “What are all reasonable endeavours?” (2011) 32 PLB 33. 
 39 .   Ibid , [32] (Moore-Bick LJ) and [70] (Longmore LJ).  Cf [53] (Lewison LJ), who came to the opposite 
conclusion. 
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discharge of its non-absolute obligation, a lower standard might be applied in contrast to a 
situation which is more within the obligor’s control. Even so, the question remains to what 
 extent is the obligor required to act contrary to its own commercial interests? Of course, 
the answer varies from case to case, depending on the contractual objectives, language and 
surrounding circumstances. In light of the potential uncertainty, it is thus recommended 
that contracting parties spell out the obligations expected of the obligor. 
 Woodside presents a slightly different situation. The contract had stipulated a 
qualifi cation to the “reasonable endeavours” clause, but there were two interpretations 
of the clause. A chief problem with the drafting of the qualifi cation clause is the use of 
the word “able”, which lends itself to be interpreted as referring to the objective ability 
to supply gas, and sits uncomfortably with the provision that the obligor may take into 
account “all relevant commercial, economic and operational matters”, which on its own 
suggests that the obligor would not be required to perform the obligation to the extent 
of sacrifi cing its own commercial interests. As such, although Gageler J had held that 
the obligor could take its own interests into account, this only went towards assessing 
its ability or capacity to perform the contract, not so much as affording a discretion to 
perform based on commercial considerations. Gageler J’s construction is, in essence, a 
literal interpretation of the clause: to read the two parts of the clause coherently, based on 
the common understanding of the English words. The majority’s construction, by contrast, 
reveals a more purposive (or contextual) interpretation of the clause. 40 As the majority had 
stressed, the clause must be interpreted in a “business-like” manner. Perhaps, a cautionary 
note from Gageler J’s dissenting judgment in  Woodside is that commercial parties should 
give greater consideration to the choice of words, so as to minimise the possibility of 
confl icting constructions. 
 Further, in  Woodside , neither the majority nor Gageler J discussed drawing a distinction 
between cases involving a third party’s performance and those that do not in determining 
whether the obligor should sacrifi ce its commercial interests. This does not mean that the 
distinction is therefore irrelevant to Australian law. The same analysis can be repackaged/
approached as a matter of construing the contract in light of all relevant circumstances and 
in this connection the fact that the operation of a non-absolute obligation clause involves a 
third party is surely a relevant factor, 41 and one that qualifi es the reasonable efforts that the 
obligor is required to make in a particular case. 
 In any event, even if the majority in  Woodside had taken this factor/distinction into 
account, they might not have come to the same result as Gageler J, even though the case 
concerned the obligor performing the act on its own. Third-party performance (or absence of) 
is merely one of the factors, albeit an important one. There are other relevant factors 
supporting the majority’s construction: a qualifi cation to the non-absolute obligation based 
on fi nancial, commercial and economic matters; it was a simple “reasonable endeavours” 
clause; the case concerned a long-term contract; it related to additional supply  beyond the 
 40 .   See G McMeel,  The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectifi cation , 2nd 
edn (Oxford University Press, 2011), 22–24 for a distinction between the literal and purposive schools of 
interpretation. 
 41 .   In  Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41, 64, Gibbs CJ said that the 
“meaning of particular words in a contract must be determined in the light of the context provided by the contract 
as a whole and the circumstances in which it was made”. 
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daily quantity. Cumulatively, read in its context, the endeavours clause operated in effect 
akin to a quasi  force majeure to enable the supplier to be discharged from its obligation 
to supply supplemental quantity if it would become too onerous to do so. In fact, we 
would also suggest that the third-party factor operates with greater force as a  prima 
facie guideline in cases where parties merely inserted a plain endeavours clause without 
prescribing within the contract the standard of reasonableness required. 
 Conclusion 
 The uncertainty generated by non-absolute obligation clauses comes about from the 
adherence to fi ne distinctions between the types of clause, as well as the vague premise that 
such clauses must be interpreted in light of the overall context. However, as the differing 
interpretations in  Woodside demonstrate, it may be cold comfort to parties relying on the 
courts to interpret such clauses contextually, when it is unclear what the relevant context 
is. Based on the two cases discussed, there are two solutions for consideration. First, 
the vague distinctions between the different types of non-absolute obligation should be 
discarded in favour of a more explicit approach which in turn encourages parties to spell 
out the extent of their obligations more clearly. Secondly, default standards should apply 
where the parties have not expressly spelt out such obligations. Such default standards 
include the relevant factors to be taken into account in interpreting such non-absolute 
obligations clauses. For example, if the clause concerns a third party’s performance, then 
the  prima facie interpretation is that the obligor should not be expected to sacrifi ce its 
commercial interests. 
 Man Yip* 
 Yihan Goh** 
 AVIATION ACCIDENT REPORTS ADMISSIBLE  IN CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE  UK 
 Hoyle v  Rogers 
 In  Hoyle v Rogers , 1 Mr Rogers was a passenger in a vintage Tiger Moth propeller bi-plane; 
Mr Hoyle was the pilot. In 2011, in the course of the fl ight, the aircraft crashed to the 
ground. Mr Rogers was killed; Mr Hoyle was seriously injured but survived. The UK Air 
Accident Investigation Branch (“AAIB”) investigated the accident and produced a report. 
The issue for the Court of Appeal was whether the report was admissible in evidence 
and whether, if admissible at all, the court should exclude it as a matter of discretion. 
 * Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University. 
 ** Assistant Professor, National University of Singapore. 
   The authors are grateful for an anonymous reviewer’s comments. All errors are, however, the authors’ own. 
 1 .   Hoyle v Rogers (Secretary of State for Transport and IATA intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 257. 
